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Abstract
Despite expanding literatures on financialization, scholarship exploring its relationship to labour 
and the labour process remains under-developed. A further obstacle has arisen from arguments 
that novel financialized modes of value extraction render the labour process and labour process 
analysis less relevant. This article challenges that view and explores how the labour process is 
still a vital focal point for value creation and extraction. It sets out what scholars should ‘look for’ 
to understand the ways in which distinctively financialized mechanisms operate in non-financial 
corporations and how these dynamics are translated into outcomes for and through labour. The 
article then provides four key propositions, drawing on labour process theory, which specify how 
those mechanisms are operationalized and their consequences.
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Introduction
As the influence of financialization extends, so a number of diverse literatures have 
emerged which increasingly converge on the message that financialization is a distinct 
form of capitalism which elevates the significance of financial markets, financial actors 
and financial motives (Epstein, 2005: 3; Lapavitsas, 2011). A review of scholarship on 
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Debates and controversies
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financialization identifies three thematic strands – as a regime of accumulation; of the 
modern corporation; and of everyday life (Van der Zwan, 2014).
Of these strands, by far the most attention has been paid to financialization as an 
accumulation regime. Though these discussions appear to move from macro to micro, 
the focus on labour, work and employment is limited. Where labour is brought into the 
picture, the emphasis is on indirect outcomes and inferences rather than a systematic 
examination of how the labour process is implicated in value creation and extraction 
under financialization.1 Recent contributions from Appelbaum and Batt (2014) and 
Appelbaum et al. (2013) argue that financialization necessitates a move away from 
exploring value relations within the labour process. This, they claim, is because finan-
cialized value is extracted primarily outside of the labour process. As Appelbaum and 
Batt previously argued the importance of mutual gains from high performance work 
systems, this is a significant shift (Appelbaum and Batt, 1994). However, their focus, and 
indeed that of much of the literature on financialization and labour, is on private equity 
(PE) and new investment funds (NIFs) rather than the much broader issue of financiali-
zation in non-financial corporations (NFCs).
Where explicit attention has been paid to financialization in the workplace, gaps 
remain. Perhaps the most notable contribution has been the debate around Thompson’s 
disconnected capitalism thesis (DCT) (Clark, 2009; Thompson, 2003, 2013). Thompson 
links the pursuit of shareholder value, the behaviour of firm management and negative 
impacts on high performance workplace productivity bargains. However, there is an 
acknowledged failure to specify and explore the mechanisms through which these trends 
take place. Scholarship has yet to uncover the novel and distinctively financialized activ-
ities taking place within organizations that both affect and are affected by labour. In other 
words ‘what’ is happening is increasingly apparent but the ‘how’ is less clear. Uncovering 
such mechanisms requires close explorations of the dynamics of value extraction and 
creation in the labour process at firm and value chain level. This article identifies such 
mechanisms and in doing so offers a corrective to the influential argument by Appelbaum 
et al. and the wider emergent assumption in the literature, that the labour process is mar-
ginalized within financialization. The article proceeds by retracing these steps. It exam-
ines the analyses of financialized regimes of accumulation and articulations of links to 
labour. Secondly it discusses the contributions of the DCT and research on NIFs, setting 
out the gaps and limits to our knowledge of financialization-labour dynamics. It then 
seeks to defend and extend the scope of labour process analysis (LPA) by outlining how 
key transmission and control mechanisms of financialization unfold in NFCs, arguing 
that novel accounting techniques play a key role. A set of propositions are then devel-
oped outlining the impact of and implications for labour.
Finance-dominated regimes of accumulation
There is now a significant body of work from ‘accumulation scholars’ ranging from het-
erodox economists to Marxists (Van der Zwan, 2014), concerned with how financializa-
tion reflects and shapes the pattern and pace of accumulation and the competing claims 
of agents within industrial and financial circuits of capital (Demirović and Sablowski, 
2013; Krippner, 2005; Lapavitsas, 2011; Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013; Milburg, 2008; 
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Müller, 2013; Stockhammer, 2008). Though interest in the links between finance and 
capitalism dates back to Hilferding (1981), contemporary commentators focus on the 
growing share of financial assets and profits of financial corporations relative to GDP, 
while emphasizing the point that NFCs in the ‘real economy’ are fully engaged actors in 
financial markets. Use of the term regime does not imply a coherent, stable growth 
trajectory. The studies listed above all explore the destabilizing impact of financializa-
tion on growth, additional vulnerability to crises and skewed distributional outcomes.2 
Additionally, financialization imposes a value logic that disrupts institutional and 
product market configurations identified traditionally by comparative political economy 
literatures.
This has led to some justified criticism of over-determinism with respect to contin-
gency and diversity arising from differential exposure to capital markets and incen-
tives for financial agents in national economies (Engelen and Konings, 2010), as well 
as varied outcomes from the interventions of financial agents such as private equity 
(Wood and Wright, 2012). Our concern is somewhat different. To the extent that litera-
tures on finance-dominant regimes have relevance to this article, it is when the focus 
goes beyond the macro economy to the firm and inter-firm level. Pressures to meet 
capital market requirements and/or service debt predispose NFCs to focus on finan-
cially leveraged outcomes and balance sheet capitalization over operational measures 
and outcomes. The resource-reward nexus becomes distorted as the corporate elite 
position themselves to extract a disproportionate amount of value in relation to the 
creation process (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). ‘Profit financialization’ focuses on 
leveraging value through financial extractions and assets compared to the rate of return 
on manufacturing and operational investment (Milburg, 2008: 423: Müller, 2013: 9). 
This exacerbates the existing trend of declining proportions of investment as a percent-
age of operating surplus and has implications for labour with respect to skill develop-
ment and other aspects of human capital development (Demirović and Sablowski, 
2013; Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). However, aside from inferred effects, plus gen-
eral talk of transfer of risk to labour, explanatory links at meso and micro level remain 
weak or indirect. In particular, how and in what ways the labour process remains a 
source of value are largely unexplored.
The role of labour3 and the labour process
The DCT brings to the fore the sometimes lost LPA links between workplace change 
and capitalist political economy and claims that financialization shifts the interconnec-
tions and pattern of dominance between industrial, financial and commercial circuits of 
capital. Financialization becomes a key driver of corporate and workplace change lead-
ing to undermining of the stable conditions necessary for workplace-based productivity 
bargains and investment in human capital. This involves a triple disconnect: between 
employer objectives in the work and employment spheres; between managerial levels 
and layers within firm governance; between corporate dynamics and state regulation in 
national business systems.
This theme of disconnections is pursued in recent contributions from Appelbaum 
et al. (2013) and Appelbaum and Batt (2014), though they prefer ‘breaches of trust’ by 
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PE to workers and other stakeholders. They offer an incisive analysis of how the finan-
cialized business model of PE makes money through extracting value from other stake-
holders including customers, creditors, suppliers and employees. Their illustrative cases 
provide evidence of negative labour impacts on jobs, pensions, wages and work inten-
sity. However this leads them to assume the marginalization of the labour process in 
value relations and they call for a diverging analytical frame. They argue that scholarship 
can ‘contribute to a more fine-grained theory of value-extraction by moving beyond the 
labour process and an exclusive focus on labour-management relations to reveal the 
variety of sources of value extraction under new forms of capitalist governance… the 
organization of work and labour relations is a limited frame’ (Appelbaum et al., 2013: 
500). Later they extend the argument, asserting the need to ‘move beyond labour process 
analysis’ (our emphasis) and towards ‘institutional analysis of PE mechanisms of value 
redistribution’ (p. 513).
There are three areas of contention here. First, does moving ‘beyond the labour pro-
cess’ allow for exploration of value extraction through labour, as well as impacts on 
workers? Second, by referring to ‘an exclusive focus on management-labour relations’ 
the authors mis-characterize the scope of LPA. Third, NIFs are part of, but not the main 
story of financialization. In the recent period 11 per cent of total assets under manage-
ment worldwide are held by private equity, hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds 
(Gospel et al., 2014: 3). Appelbaum and Batt are rightly keen to emphasize the distinc-
tive characteristics and effects of PE, focusing on the ways in which higher levels of debt 
used to buy out companies lead to enhanced pressures for higher than average returns in 
a short time frame; as well as to the complete dominance of PE partners in firm govern-
ance. Despite careful noting of these differences to NFCs, Appelbaum and Batt’s general 
theoretical conclusions are premised on the view that PE ‘exemplifies’ financialization. 
(2014: 6). However, the dynamics pertinent to value extraction and the labour process 
may be at least partially different in NFCs.
This critical interrogation of the Appelbaum, Batt and Clark argument is not in itself 
adequate. As indicated earlier, largely lacking are studies exploring how distinctive 
financialized activities are connected to or manifested in NFCs, and more specifically 
how shareholder value pressures are ‘translated’ into workplace outcomes and experi-
ences. In another recent contribution exploring the labour outcomes associated with 
PE and other NIFs, Gospel et al. (2014) refer to ‘transmission mechanisms’ as short-
ened time horizons, new corporate strategies and shifts in the balance of stakeholder 
governance, though noting that ‘downstream’ activities are largely indirect and not 
easily traceable. The latter is indeed true, but what is needed are accounts that can at 
least proceed towards that goal. A useful framework is offered by Baud and Durand 
(2012: 243–4) in their study of financialization and retail firms. Baud and Durand dis-
tinguish between the (mainly macro) financialization of objectives (value norms/strat-
egy, investment) and the firm level financialization of operations, including relations 
with workers, customers and suppliers. Clark and Macey (2015) also draw on these 
categories to identify the ‘contagion effects’ of financialization within firms, though 
they combine them with the idea of ‘profit’ and ‘control’ financialization. The former 
was discussed earlier, while the latter is said to identify managerial strategies that are 
applied in the workplace.
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These categories are helpful in indicating where to look, but the next section sets out 
what scholars should look for to more fully understand the mechanisms driving finan-
cialized outcomes.4
Financialized investment and valuation in NFCs
Distinctively financialized pressures enter NFCs via institutional investors who have 
grown in prominence to own over 80 per cent of UK equities (Roberts et al., 2006: 278) 
and 73 per cent of US equities in 2009 (Tonello and Rabimov, 2010). The principal 
activity of institutional investors appears to consist not merely of holding NFC shares, 
but buying and selling them based on perceptions of intrinsic value to outperform the 
index or asset class they are benchmarked against (Blake and Timmerman, 2002; 
Hendry et al., 2006: 1103). High investor turnover means corporate management must 
continuously stimulate a market for their shares by making them desirable both to exist-
ing and potential investors (Hendry et al., 2006; Roberts et al., 2006). Corporate chief 
executives and finance directors now commit more of their time to investor communi-
cations (Pye, 2001).
In addition to the changing composition of financial markets, recent decades have 
seen a shift in investor strategies. The idea that stock has an intrinsic value distinct from 
the listed price, calculated by estimating future performance, took hold and achieved 
widespread legitimation when economic theory labelled market listings ‘informationally 
deficient’ (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Investor acceptance of the paradox positioned 
estimations of future firm performance as key sources of competitive advantage among 
the investment community. To estimate intrinsic value investors, usually via financial 
analysts, combine company information with a predictive valuation model. A key output 
of an analyst’s report is ‘target price’, which is their expectation of a company’s share 
price in twelve months. Financial analysts play a central intermediary role in capital 
markets in interpreting and disseminating corporate financial and related market infor-
mation, and their investment recommendations have a material impact on trading activ-
ity (Womack, 1996). Institutional investors report using an average of 14 different 
valuation factors to gauge intrinsic stock value (Merrill Lynch Institutional Factor 
Survey, 2012). The most popular valuation factors are listed in Table 1 and trends in 
recent years indicate that investors are placing heightened emphasis on cash returns 
(Bank of America Merrill Lynch Institutional Factor Survey, 2012).
The prominence of these factors mean it is important to consider how they shape 
value related decision making within NFCs. Creating investor confidence in an equity’s 
intrinsic value requires management to craft corporate strategies that enhance the organi-
zation’s performance under the numerous financialized valuation factors. A concern 
shared among a diverse range of academic and professional commentators is the ten-
dency of the dominant valuation factors to steer corporate management away from inter-
nal firm investment and value creating activities (Orhangazi, 2008). In particular, popular 
financial factors tend to produce ratios not values, comprising of a numerator and 
denominator which are an indication of profits and costs respectively. Firm management 
have generally sought to improve their ratio by reducing the denominator through cost 
reduction, because value extraction activities are more predictable and generally 
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accessible within a short timeframe. Increasing the growth side of the ratio is riskier as 
value creation gains are less certain and only likely to appear five to ten years later 
(Christensen and Van Bever, 2014: 4). In fact, financial actors tend not to respond posi-
tively to complex exploratory innovation (Gupta, 2012) and favour value creation strate-
gies only among firms deemed to be high performing (Jacobs and Singhal, 2014). The 
pressure on management to reduce costs is compounded by the historic long-term decline 
in the ability of firms in many sectors to create value through raising price. Prominent 
innovation strategists lament this trend towards the ‘wrong’ kind of innovation, namely 
‘efficiency innovation’ which eliminates jobs rather than ‘market-creating innovation’ 
that creates them (Christensen and Van Bever, 2014).
All these processes drive financialization of NFC investment which takes two main 
forms. First, an investor-oriented redistributive agenda through dividend payments and 
share buybacks (Van der Zwan, 2014: 108). Second, the growth of investment in finan-
cial assets and activities rather than those at an ‘operational’ level, often to the detriment 
of the productive capacity of firms. The move away from value creating investment is 
increasingly apparent in sectors where product market returns are longer term and less 
predictable. In ‘Big Pharma’ the high R&D spend required for exploratory innovation 
and the difficulty in quantifying future product market returns has seen trends towards 
outsourcing of R&D activities to bio technology firms (Andersson et al., 2010). 
Financialized investment also helps to explain trends within certain business models. 
Baud and Durand (2012) show that the financial assets ratio of leading retail firms in the 
2000s increased for most, accounting for an upward trend in return on equity despite 
constraints on domestic sales growth and international expansion. Milburg also notes 
evidence indicating ‘a change in the gap between the rate of return on manufacturing 
investment and the rate of return on financial assets’ (2009: 423). Ultimately, the novel 
financialized valuation factors are key transmission mechanisms connecting NFCs with 
the interests of investors. Achieving these financialized targets has led to distinct forms 
of organizational control or ‘control financialization’.
NFCs rely heavily on accounting techniques that provide quasi-legal firm level con-
trol mechanisms to position financial targets central and dominant in decision making 
Table 1. Top valuation factors used by institutional investors.
Factor Percentage Using
Price Earnings (P/E) Ratio 81
Beta 68
Enterprise Value (EV)/EBITDA 60
Return on Earnings (ROE) 55
Size 54
Price/Free Cash Flow (P/FCF) 53
Price to Book (P/B) Ratio 53
Share Repurchase 51
Estimate Revision 50
Profit Margins 47
Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch Institutional Factor Survey (2012).
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(Froud et al., 2006; O’Neill, 2001). Budgeting processes can provide a firm wide control 
mechanism through which targets relating to value creation and extraction can be dis-
seminated and measured (Cushen, 2013). Accounting regulations require that internal 
company investment and projects be assessed and justified on the basis of measures such 
as Net Present Value, Internal Rate of Return (IRR), payback period, discounted payback 
period, average accounting rate of return and profitability index. Management can select 
the financial measure(s) that most closely mirror the calculations of the valuation 
factor(s) they wish to perform well against, allowing them to orient and assess lower 
organizational levels to the financialized targets. However arriving at the desired finan-
cial endgame is neither straightforward nor automatic.
Labour process issues and impacts
Financial targets must be delivered by employees – meaning it is within the labour pro-
cess that interventions prompted by the speculative financialized firm valuations con-
front a ‘moment of truth’. In the discussion below are four interrelated propositions 
consistent with LPA that link the aforementioned transmission and control mechanisms 
with financialized labour outcomes.
Proposition one: Financialization drives forms of value extraction based on squeez-
ing labour costs and revenues.
The pursuit of shareholder value, expressed by financial valuation factors, prompts ‘dra-
matic efforts to control costs’ (Milburg, 2009: 428) as ‘market pressure to maintain asset 
prices is, at the same time, a pressure on labour as variable capital’ (Bryan et al., 2009: 
467). Value extraction via cost cutting is associated with labour and the labour process 
through headcount reduction interventions such as redundancies, outsourcing, centraliza-
tion and supply chain harmonization, as well as increasing reward insecurity. Headcount 
reduction is central to financialized ‘downsize and redistribute’ strategies (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 2000) and share buybacks (Lazonick, 2013). Furthermore, accounting tech-
niques are important mechanisms used to identify and communicate labour cost reduction 
initiatives. In NFCs, employee related expenditure is categorized in financial accounts as 
a cost, namely operational expenditure (OPEX). OPEX reduction is a key measure for 
signalling commitment to and delivery of targets to shareholders. Financial markets react 
positively to announcements relating to OPEX reduction, particularly redundancies and 
outsourcing (Farber and Hallock, 1999). Recent decades have seen increased use of cost 
accounting techniques such as activity based costing (ABC) and benchmarking due pri-
marily to the restructuring and cost cutting opportunities that ABC prompts. The shares of 
firms adopting ABC outperform matched non-ABC firms in the short term by approxi-
mately 27 per cent (Kennedy and Affleck-Graves, 2001).
Additionally, financialization affects wage levels and dispersion given that ‘as the 
circuits of capital change…[there is an] emphasis to drive down the labour share’ (Clark 
and Macey, 2015: 26). Though rapidly growing wage inequality within firms is a longer 
term macro-economic phenomenon, increased emphasis on profit targets and reducing 
payroll sharpens that divide. Cost reduction targets exert downward pressure on wages 
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and constraints on the ability to share performance improvements with the workforce 
(Cushen, 2013). This is confirmed in Appelbaum and Batt’s illustrative cases, ‘In the 
PE-owned plants post buyout, higher productivity was accompanied by lower employ-
ment growth and wage reductions, thereby contributing to an increase in the productiv-
ity-wage gap’ (2014: 233). In some instances financial engineering and squeezing labour 
might not be coterminous processes, such as when staffing costs had been cut back in UK 
privatized utilities to the extent that debt leverage was a more viable source of value 
 reallocation (Goergen et al., 2014). However, such practices are still likely to weaken the 
position of and constrain future internal investments in labour, thereby indirectly recou-
pling the processes.
Proposition two: Financialized investment is a driver of perpetual restructuring that 
exacerbates work insecurity and intensification.
Interventions designed to ward off investor risk and ensure investor returns, such as 
moving to high dividend ratios, share buybacks and taking on debt, create a bias towards 
investment that is geared more towards financial engineering. This, in turn, feeds cor-
porate restructuring which has surged in recent decades in order to create a vision of a 
better future for investors. It arises primarily from the desire to deliver value through 
the disposal and acquiring of corporate assets based on their status within accounting 
techniques. For example it is not uncommon for firms to outsource teams of personnel, 
a cost, but retain ownership of the equipment, an asset employees continue to use when 
outsourced. Within this uncertainty labour absorbs risk disproportionate to the reward 
they may derive. The perpetual restructuring and continuous organizational upheaval 
affect labour and the labour process in two key ways. Firstly, employees experience 
heightened employment insecurity due to the emphasis on headcount reduction 
(Kalleberg, 2011, Lazonick, 2013) as well as role insecurity, as their position and status 
within the organization are in perpetual flux (Cushen, 2013). Secondly, depleting 
internal operational investment and continuous structural upheaval trigger work inten-
sification linked to reduced headcount, use of peripheral employment, less development 
and training and the need to navigate continuously restructured work processes and 
changing personnel. Value gains from reorganization of work and restructuring of 
employment in firms and across supply chains are appropriated by shareholders (Baud 
and Durand, 2012: 256). Combining elements of propositions two and three, Clark and 
Macey’s (2015: 19–20) study shows how pressures to service debt and dividend 
payments following a PE takeover of the Automobile Association in 2013 led to 3400 
employees being ‘managed out of the business’, with work intensification for those 
remaining.
Proposition three: Financialization engenders a shift in control mechanisms that 
strengthens punitive performance regimes.
Financialized valuations create a ‘performance exposure’ (Bryan et al., 2009: 466) 
that drives management by numbers and strengthens the trend towards centrally driven, 
short term financial measures of performance. Firm valuations prompt a myriad of, often 
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concurrent, workplace initiatives that come with defined financial targets that manage-
ment hope will be accepted and delivered by labour at the point of production. The worst 
thing investors can be told is that an organization did not achieve targets, and a failure to 
deliver the numbers with one initiative prompts more interventions in order to find alter-
native routes to the promised future. The consequences for labour relate primarily to the 
increased use of numerics in performance management as corporate profit targets are 
cascaded downwards (Ezzamel et al., 2008). Localized versions of these financial meas-
ures are disseminated throughout the organization and used to measure progress against 
both value creation and extraction targets, aided in many cases by electronic monitoring 
and tighter work flow (Taylor, 2013). The shift towards cascaded financial controls, 
together with the associated insecurity and transfer of risk to labour, either marginalizes 
cultural and commitment-led interventions or diminishes their potential effectiveness 
(Cushen and Thompson, 2012). This is not to say that normative controls are irrelevant 
in managerial regimes, but that high performance and commitment-seeking are frequently 
recast as conduct and behavioural descriptors manifested in performance demonstrated by 
achievement of financial targets (Taylor, 2013: 46–7). New configurations of control also 
recast labour responses. Employees across a range of skill levels and disciplines are 
increasingly required to consider and quantify their contribution to the ‘bottom line’ 
(Ezzamel et al., 2008; Gleadle and Cornelius, 2008).
Proposition four: Financialization reinforces market discipline and market attitudes
Tighter internal controls, post-crash fiscal constraints and other external circum-
stances favourable to capital, combined with longer term weakening of collective 
labour organization, has resulted in market discipline limiting the scope for resist-
ance. A range of OECD statistics and qualitative studies show how capital has reas-
serted its power over organized labour and labour markets in the US, UK and Western 
Europe (Peters, 2011). However, labour’s response is not limited to mere compliance. 
Enhanced instrumentalization of labour effects employees’ behaviours and percep-
tions of the employment experience. Business sources from HR professionals (Rayton 
et al, 2012) and The Harvard Business Review (Caulkin, 2014) join academics in 
charting declining trust and employee engagement levels, rising cynicism and a more 
general crisis of attachment and disaffection for companies (Naus et al., 2007; 
McCann, 2013). Financialization is part of and adds to these trends, prompting cyni-
cal and calculative behaviours in circumstances where employees understand them-
selves as a quantifiable, disposable commodity and as a distinct stakeholder with 
interests that conflict with and lose out to those of capital.
Concluding remarks
Far from being marginalized by financialization, this article demonstrates that the manner 
in which labour and the labour process is being called upon to contribute to organizational 
value has in fact expanded. Appelbaum et al. (2013) have called for a more fine grained 
account of value extraction that looks beyond the labour process and labour process 
analysis. While in no way dissenting from the view that financialization broadens the 
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dynamics of value creation and extraction at macro and micro level, there remains a key 
challenge in reverse terms – to connect the two phenomena. An important part of making 
such connections is to identify ‘transmission’ mechanisms that go beyond general refer-
ence to short time horizons or new corporate strategies. A distinctive contribution of this 
article is that it identifies meso level mechanisms, in particular valuation factors and 
accounting practices that act to coordinate an assembly of firm level elements, namely 
people and processes, orienting them toward achievement of financial targets. The out-
comes manifested in the labour process, such as headcount reduction, work restructuring 
and cascading financial controls, operate both as key subjective features of corporate nar-
ratives and objective measures of ‘progress’ towards meeting capital market expectations. 
This is consistent with the previously-discussed concepts of profit and control financiali-
zation (Clark and Macey, 2015), with meso-level mechanisms operating as means of 
embedding broader financialized objectives through operational strategies and measures.
It is important, however, to recognize that financialization within the corporate sphere 
is not a single, coherent process. Nor is it defined by the complete supplanting of value 
expansion through production. Rather it is characterized by tensions between sources of 
value extraction and the inability of firms to achieve targets in the manner speculated or, 
in some cases, at all (Burnham, 2010; Froud et al., 2006). For labour, many of the 
propositions outlined in the previous sections are ‘interacting with accelerating and 
exacerbating longer term trends such as labour market insecurity, externalization and 
internationalization’ (Thompson, 2013). Labour process change therefore continues to 
reflect product and labour market competition and sources of value. This is a shift in the 
circuits of capital, not a wholesale displacement, and the extent to which financialization 
is a primary or secondary driver of change varies by industry.
Finally, while conditions of value extraction have created a need to move beyond 
workplace-centric employment relations and national varieties of capitalism, LPA is well 
placed to make connections between accumulation regimes and firm and industry-level 
dynamics. Continuing focus on labour and the labour process is an important corrective 
to the claims that changes in value creation and extraction in financialization and other 
spheres are focused wholly or mainly outside production. This is clearly not the end of 
the story. A priority for future research is company, industry or value chain framing in 
which financialization trajectories and the relations with labour can be more adequately 
traced and explained. Aggregate level data on the general characteristics and effects of 
financialization is very useful for understanding and critiquing the new business models. 
However, as Appelbaum and Batt (2014) accept, there are limits to this data in assessing 
labour issues such as job destruction and creation – hence their own detailed company 
cases. With a clearer identification of mechanisms and their effects at strategic and 
operational levels, this article contributes towards the development of frameworks for 
undertaking such investigation.
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Notes
1. Labour is viewed as a central source of value creation and financialization acts in part through 
value extraction in the labour process. Though a work in progress, this terminology draws on 
radical accounting frameworks (Froud et al., 2006; Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013) rather 
than the labour theory of value.
2. Confusion in the use of accumulation regime can arise because the term derives in part from 
regulation theory, some of whose adherents argued that financialization offered a basis for a new 
stable growth regime (see Wood and Wright, 2012). As the detailed treatment in Van der Zwan 
(2014) makes clear, that orientation is not shared by contemporary accumulation scholars.
3. A focus on labour is clearly broader than on the labour process. For example, Bryan et al. 
(2009) argue that financialization constitutes labour as a form of capital, advancing into the 
household and private sphere as a ‘frontier of accumulation’, binding labour to ‘participate in 
expanded reproduction’.
4. A mechanism is ‘… an assembly of elements producing an effect not inherent in any one 
of them. A mechanism is not so much about “nuts and bolts” as about “cogs and wheels”… 
the wheelwork or agency by which an effect is produced’ (Hernes, 1998: 74 in Davis and 
Marquis, 2005: 336).
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